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Abstract. 
Income-expenditure surveys typically provide incomes on the household level. As households can 
differ  in  size  and  needs,  a  reliable  assessment  of  inequality  in  living  standards,  therefore, 
necessitates  the  conversion  of  the  original  heterogeneous  into  an  artificial  quasi-homogeneous 
population. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004) theoretically explore the properties of 
two alternative conversion strategies: a weighting of household equivalent incomes by size and by 
needs. We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study for examining the sensitivity of the Gini 
and the Theil index to the chosen conversion strategy, and explain our results by means of an 
inequality decomposition by population subgroups. 
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Researchers and the public are eager to know about the distribution of living standards across 
individuals  in  a  society.  The  living  standard  is  determined  by  the  material  comfort  goods  and 
services available to each person provide. Usually, ‘household income’ serves as a proxy for the 
level of material comfort. Yet, this proxy is biased when comparisons involve household types that 
are heterogeneous. The concept of equivalent incomes masters this problem. Equivalent incomes 
are incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of persons living in different household 
types. Dividing the income of a household by the equivalent income of the one-member household 
gives the (relative) equivalence scale of the former household. Accordingly, an equivalence scale 
quantifies household needs relative to an ‘equivalent (single) adult.’  
Based on household-level income data, the one-member-household equivalent income can 
be assigned to each household member and all individuals of an economy can be viewed as living in 
separate one-member households. The consequent artificial quasi-homogeneous distribution of one-
member-households’  equivalent  incomes  captures  the  inequality  of  living  standards  among 
individuals. Still, even if one imposes income independent equivalence scales, such a conversion is 
not innocuous from a normative perspective (cf. Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004)). 
Especially, it does not meet the condition that an income transfer, which reduces the difference in 
living standards of two households, must not increase inequality (cf. Ebert and Moyes (2003)). To 
meet this condition, Ebert and Moyes (2003) suggest an alternative conversion procedure; i.e., to 
weight the equivalent income of any household unit by a factor that is equal (proportional) to its 
equivalence  scale.  The  outcome  is  a  quasi-homogeneous  distribution  that  depicts  inequality  of 
livings standards among equivalent adults. 
  In  this  article,  we  contrast  inequality  estimates  derived  from  size-  and  needs-weighted 
distributions. Inequality is measured by means of the Theil and the Gini index, both being among 
the most popular inequality measures in applied research. Estimates are provided for an extensive 
set of countries, also varying equivalence scales. Theil and Gini indices turn out to be sensitive to 
the chosen conversion procedure, and differences in the estimates are sufficiently large to change 
country  inequality  rankings  –  including  reasonable  levels  of  household-size  economies.  An 
inequality decomposition by household types reveals that this is due to an empirical regularity: 
compared to smaller household units, equivalent incomes of larger units tend to be distributed more 
equally. 
  Here is a roadmap to our paper. In Section 2, we suggest a useful benchmark scenario for 
investigating why needs-weighted inequality estimates are higher, and introduce the key concepts   
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underlying our empirical analysis. In Section 3, we briefly explain our database and present our 
empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper.   
 
2 Preliminary considerations 
2.1 A useful benchmark 
To account for the dependence of peoples’ living standards on household size and composition, 
household  incomes  are  converted  into  equivalent  incomes.  Equivalence  scales  serve  as  the 
conversion device. Taking the one-member household as the reference, an equivalence scale gives 
the  percentage  change  in  household  income  required  to  maintain  the  living  standard  of  each 
household member as further members are added. If household-size economies are achieved, the 
percentage change in household income which holds the living standard of a household’s members 
constant is less than the percentage increase in family size. In practice there is no consensus about 
what the ‘correct’ equivalence scale is. For this reason, we apply a parametric equivalence scale 
suggested in Buhmann et al. (1988) that is rather flexible and allows for the variation of household-
size economies through a single parameter. According to Buhmann et al. (1988), an equivalence 
scale can be written as ( )
θ
i i h ES = , where  n i ,..., 1 =  denotes the household type and  i h  is its number 
of  members.  Household-size  economies  are  represented  by  the  catch-all  parameter  θ ,  with 
1 0 ≤ ≤θ , the ‘equivalence-scale elasticity.’  
From  this  specification  it  follows  that  ( )
θ
κ κ i i i h x y , , =   is  the  one-member  household’s 
equivalent income of a household κ  of type  i with household income i x , κ . A distribution of one-
member-households’  equivalent  incomes  (DOMHEI)  is  derived  from  the  original  household-
income  distribution  by  calculating,  for  each  household  unit,  one-member  household  equivalent 
income and assigning this number to each household member. Consequently, we use the acronym 
‘size-weighting’ to describe the conversion of the heterogeneous population into the DOMHEI. 
Compared with this, the conversion strategy of Ebert and Moyes (2003) requires that the equivalent 
income of any household unit is assigned to the number of equivalent adults living in the same 
household (alias the household’s equivalence scale). The outcome is a ‘distribution of equivalent 
adult  households’  equivalent  incomes’  (DEAHEI),  and  we  refer  to  this  type  of  conversion  as 
‘needs-weighting.’
1  
                                                            
1 Albeit its appealing properties from a normative perspective, the information content of such a distribution is open to 
debate. As O’Higgins, Schmaus and Smeeding (1990, p. 26) stressed and Podder and Chatterjee (2002, p. 11) later re-
echoed: “Equivalent adults do not exist, unlike families or individuals, although a family or an individual may have an 
equivalent income.”   
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Two special cases can be considered. First, the within-household production technology is 
such  that  full  household-size  economies  are  achieved  ( 0 = θ ).  Then  household  income  equals 
equivalent  income,  and  ‘h  household  members  live  as  cheap  as  one.’  In  this  scenario,  the 
equivalence scale is the same for all household types. Therefore, needs-weighting implies that all 
household incomes are weighted by the same factor, whereas, in case of size-weighting, household 
income  is  assigned  to  each  household  member.  Second,  the  within-household  production 
technology is such that household-size economies achieved are zero ( 1 = θ ), and ‘h household 
members live as cheap as h.’ In this case, the DOMHEI and the DEAHEI are equivalent concepts. 
Hence, this scenario may be seen as an eligible benchmark for investigating how DOMHEI- and 
DEAHEI-based inequality estimates differ when household-size economies go up.   
 
2.2 Implications for inequality 
Let  i Κ denote the number of households belonging to type  i.  Then, the number of artificial one-






. Again, we focus on household unit 
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, κ   is  the  population  share  of  all  artificial  one-
member households formerly belonging to household unit κ , and 
DOMHEI
i p , κ is the population share 
of κ  in the DOMHEI. The equivalent-income share of all artificial one-member households derived 
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being the mean equivalent income of all households of type i. Compared to this, needs-weighting 
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These differences have immediate implications for inequality estimates elicited from the two 
quasi-homogeneous  populations.  For  example,  think  of  a  heterogeneous  population  with  many 
equally rich one-member households (in terms of equivalent income), and one poor multi-member 
household.  Then  the  DEAHEI  Lorenz  dominates  the  DOMHEI,  and  size-weighted  relative 
inequality  estimates  would  indicate  more  inequality  than  needs-weighted  estimates.  Yet,  the   
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conversion procedure (and also the level of  θ ) does not affect the degree of relative inequality 
among incomes of a quasi-homogeneous subgroup originating from the same household type. The 
ratios  of  population  shares  and  equivalent-incomes  of  any  such  two  households  always  equal 








i p p p p   and  1, 2, 1, 2, i i i i y y x x constant = = .  Hence,  for  this 
subgroup,  a  scale  invariant,  relative  inequality  index  is  not  affected  by  the  chosen  conversion 
strategy.  Yet,  what  will  typically  change  is  inequality  between  subgroups.  An  inequality 
decomposition by household types may, therefore, help in determining the effects that the two 
conversion strategies have on inequality.  
 
2.3 Decomposing inequality by subgroups 
Decomposability of an inequality measure implies a coherent relationship between inequality in the 
whole population and inequality in its constituent mutually exclusive subgroups. The basic idea is 
to express overall inequality as a function of inequality within and between its subgroups. An index 
is additively decomposable if it can be written as a weighted sum of the within-subgroup inequality 
indices  plus  a  between-subgroup  inequality  term  based  on  mean  incomes  and  subgroup  sizes. 
Obviously, it is quite exceptionable that an inequality index possesses such properties, but the Theil 
coefficient  is  a  pleasant  example.  Other  measures  including  the  Gini  coefficient  are  only 
decomposable, and a residual term remains.  
Identifying  subgroups  of  quasi-homogeneous  households  originating  from  equally  typed 
households is the basic idea underlying our empirical analysis. This identification enables us to 
quantify how features of household-type specific income distributions affect inequality in living 
standards among artificial homogeneous units. Suppressing the DOMHEI/DEAHEI superscript, a 
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where 
T W  is the within-subgroup component, 

















=   Κ   ∑   
is  the  Theil  index  of  the  subgroup  constructed  from  household  type  i.
2  The  within-subgroup 
component of equation (1) is the sum of the subgroup specific Theil indices (equation (2)), whereby 
each  i T  is weighted by the population share  i p  times     i . The latter expression captures how far 
type-i’s deviates from overall mean equivalent income. Inequality between subgroups is measured   
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by the second term on the right hand side of (1), and is determined by the weighted sum of relative 
deviations of subgroup specific from overall mean equivalent income.  
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where  i G   is  the  Gini  index  of  the  subgroup  originating  from  type-i  households,
3  i π   is  the 
equivalent income share of i in total equivalent income (‘economic weight’), and O is the ‘overlap 
term.’ Correspondingly to the Theil decomposition, within-group inequality, as captured by the first 
term of equation (3), is represented by the weighted sum of subgroup specific Gini coefficients. 
Between-subgroup  inequality  is  given  by  the  sum  of  relative  differences  in  mean  equivalent 
incomes of any two subgroups, i and  j , weighted by  j ip π , whereby subgroups are ranked by mean 
equivalent income such that i j     > . Abstracting from  j ip π , addends are the larger the bigger the 
relative difference in two subgroups’ mean equivalent incomes is, viz. comparing ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ 
subgroups. Finally, the third term of (3) measures the overlap of subgroups’ equivalent income 
distributions: ceteris paribus, the overlap is the higher the closer together the subgroup means of 
equivalent incomes are (see Lambert and Aranson (1993), p. 1226).
4 
  In  (1-3),  some  elements  are  invariant  to  the  way  the  quasi-homogeneous  population  is 
constructed from the underlying heterogeneous one, namely  i   s,  i G s,  i T s, and  O. Others, listed 

























































































i p : fraction of equivalent adults in the DEAHEI originating from type i households;  
￿ 
DOMHEI
i π : equivalent income share in the DOMHEI originating from type i households;  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 See Cowell (1995), pp. 149-154, for details. 





i π : equivalent income share in the DEAHEI originating from type i households; 
￿ 
DOMHEI   : mean equivalent income per capita in the DOMHEI;  
￿ 
DEAHEI   : mean equivalent income per equivalent adult in the DEAHEI. 
 
3 Sensitivity analysis 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical examination is based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). For 30 
countries  and  several  years,  the  LIS  provides  representative  micro-level  information on private 
households’ incomes and demographic characteristics (i.e., number, age and gender of each family 
member). To keep the empirical analysis tractable, only 20 countries (the US and 19 European 
countries)  from  a  single  LIS  wave  (1999/2000;  see  the  Appendix  Table  A1  for  details)  are 
considered.
5 Additionally, only data from nine household types are taken into account: one- and 
two-adult households with zero up to three children, and childless three-adult households.
6  
Equivalent incomes are based on the LIS variable ‘household disposable income’ (DPI). 
DPI  is  harmonized  across  countries,  covers  labor  earnings,  property  income,  and  government 
transfers in cash minus income and payroll taxes.
7 As DPIs are denoted in local currencies and 
prices,  they  are  transformed into PPP adjusted Dollars. DPIs from year 1999 are also growth-
adjusted and deflated by inter-temporal price indices to the year 2000. All deflators and conversion 
factors are summarized in Table A1. To meet the restrictions on the income domain imposed by 
Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004), only households with positive DPIs are considered. 
For each household type and country separately, Table 1a provides the number of observations (not 
weighted),
8  the  fraction  of  the  country-wide  populations  living  in  the  same  household  type 
(weighted), and the average disposable household income per month (weighted, PPP adjusted in 
USD in 2000). In addition, Table 1b summarizes sum further aggregate features of the resulting 
country data bases, including the total number of observations (non-weighted), average household 
income, average household size and the fraction of the country population belonging to the nine 
distinguished  household  types  (column  label:  ‘coverage’).  It  turns  out  that  the  coverage  is 
satisfactory well in all 20 countries we study, never falling below 75 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
4 For a more detailed discussion on the decomposability of the Gini and the properties of its different components see, 
for example, Lambert and Decoster (2005) and references cited therein. 
5 Bönke and Schröder (2007) used wave V.1 in an earlier version of this paper.  
6  We  use  the  LIS  variables  ‘d4’  and  ‘d27’  to  distinguish  adults  from  children,  where  ‘d27’  gives  the  number  of 
household members of age below 18 and ‘d4’ denotes the total number of household members. 
7  For  the  exact  DPI  definition  see  Luxembourg  Income  Study  (2006),  and  for  its  cross-country  comparability 




[Table 1a about here] 
[Table 1b about here] 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics of country-specific quasi-homogeneous distributions 
This section summarizes several features of the country equivalent-income distributions, all of them 




i p p along the 
dimension of θ . The figure shows how much size- and needs weighted subgroup population shares 
differ. Estimates referring to the same country are connected by an interpolated line. Symbols and 
formats of lines (dashed vs. solid) distinguish estimates across countries. As the Buhman et al. 
(1988) equivalence scale makes no distinction between adults and children, only the number of 




i p p  estimates coincide for A1C1 and A2C0, for 
A1C2, A2C1 and A3C0, as well as for A1C3 and A2C2. Accordingly, the five graphs in Figure 1 
convey all the empirical findings.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 




i p p -curves are always downwards sloped. For two-member households (A1C1 and 




i p p   and  θ :  In  most  countries,  the 




i p p -
curves are upwards sloped. These patterns can be explained by country demographics. Average 
household size in a country is, 
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and average equivalence scale is, 















                                                                                                                                                                                                
8  We  provide  the  unweighted  number  of  observations  to  give  the  reader  a  clear picture of the actual numbers of 



































The term  h ES  is smaller than 1.0 if  1 < θ  and if there is at least one multi-member household. 
Moreover,  h ES   is  increasing  in  θ   as  0 > ∂ ∂ θ i ES   for  0 1C A i ≠ .  As 




C A p p 0 1 0 1 is  strictly  monotonically  increasing  in  θ .  For  multi-member 




i p p  as  i i ES h   is 
decreasing in θ , thus mitigating the  h ES  effect. It turns out that  h ES  is more sensitive to a θ  




i p p  is strictly  decreasing in θ . For subgroups A1C1 and A2C0,  i h  is less or almost 








i p p -curve  is  u-shaped:  This  especially  applies  to  Norway  ( 99 . 1 = h )  and  Finland  





i p p  relationships have immediate implications for inequality, as can 
be seen from equations (1-3). Consider, for example, the between-subgroup component. Here we 
have that the weights assigned to differences in subgroup-specific mean equivalent incomes are 
contingent  upon  the  type  of  conversion.  But  subtle  differences  even  arise  concerning  the 
classification of ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ subgroups.’ Following equation (1), one can call subgroup i  
￿  ‘rich’ if  1 >
DOMHEI
i     ; respectively if  1 >
DEAHEI
i     , 
￿  ‘poor’ if  1 <
DOMHEI
i     ; respectively if  1 <
DEAHEI
i     . 
Figure 2 encompasses such ratios in nine separate graphs, containing six lines each. Solid lines are 
estimates of equivalent-income ratios derived from the DOMHEI; dashed lines from the DEAHEI. 
For  both  types  of  conversion,  three  lines  are  provided.  The  upper  line  gives  the  cross-country 
maximum of the equivalent income ratio, and the lower line the respective minimum. The line in 
between  represents  the  cross-country  mean.  With  the  exception  of  the  needs-weighted  A2CO 
subgroup, lines referring to subgroups originating from one- or two-member households are always 
upward sloping. Hence, these subgroups become ‘richer’ as θ  goes up. For all other subgroups, 
downward sloping lines imply that they become relatively ‘poorer’ as θ  goes up. According to our 
definition  of  ‘rich’  and  ‘poor,’  A1C0-A1C3  subgroups  are  notably  poor.  Across  all  countries, 
average equivalent income of the A1C1 subgroup (A1C3 subgroup) is about 28 percent (50 percent)   
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below the average when  6 . 0 = θ  (=0.55) – irrespective of whether households are needs or size 
weighted.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Subgroups’  population  and  equivalent  income  ratios  again  determine  the  overall  mean 
equivalent  income  ratio:  mean  equivalent  income  per  one-member  household  divided  by  mean 












DEAHEI DOMHEI p p
1 1
        ,  again  as  functions  of  θ .  For  all  countries, the 
DEAHEI DOMHEI     -curve is downward-sloping for low values of θ , intersects the 1.0-threshold line 
from above at some medium level of θ , and then converges against the threshold line from below. 
This pattern is the aggregate outcome of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 2. 


















































1 9 ,  




i π π -curves are positively sloped for 
subgroups A1C0, A1C1 and A2C0, and negatively sloped else. As can be seen from equation (9), 
this pattern is caused by the interaction of the relationships presented in Figures 1 and 3. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
3.3 Sensitivity of inequality estimates 
3.3.1 Theil index 
Figure 5 presents our main results on the sensitivity of the Theil index. The upper left graph depicts 
the  ratio 
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T plotted  against  admissible  values  of  θ .  In  a  predominant  number  of 
countries, 
DEAHEI T  exceeds 
DOMHEI T  and the ratio 
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T falls with  θ . Only in Poland, 
Norway and Sweden and for high values of θ  ,  1 >
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T . Relative differences between 
DOMHEI T  and 
DEAHEI T  can be substantial. For example, the index ratio is about 0.83 for  10 . 0 = θ in 
Slovenia, Belgium and Ireland. Moreover, ratios differ substantially across countries. For example,   
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02 . 1 =
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T  in Poland and 0.93 in Ireland for  60 . 0 = θ . As we will show in Section 3.4, 
these cross-country differences are sufficiently large to affect country inequality rankings.  
  To understand the relationship presented in the upper right graph of Figure 5, we also depict 
the ratios of size- and needs-weighted within- and between-subgroup component ratios. The within-
subgroup  component  ratio, 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T W W
, , ,  is  depicted  in  the  lower  left  graph.  Like  the 
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T -ratio, the 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T W W
, , -ratio increases in θ , and is usually smaller than 
1.0. Compared to the DEAHEI, the population share of inequality-diminishing groups, therefore, 
must  be  higher  in  the  DOMHEI.  As  size-weighting  attaches  larger  weights  to  multi-member 
household  units,  equivalent-incomes  of  ‘large’  households  should  be  distributed  more  equally. 
Indeed, subgroup-specific Theil indices – provided in Table 2 – give empirical support: Especially 
children tend to have an inequality-reducing effect. Only Poland, Norway and Sweden deviate from 
this empirical regularity. And, exactly in these three countries, the 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T W W
, , -ratio is 
non-increasing in θ .  
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  Finally, turning to the between-group component of the Theil index, the lower left graph of 
Figure  5  gives  the 
, , T DOMHEI T DEAHEI B B -  ratio.  For  small  values  of  θ , 
, , T DOMHEI T DEAHEI B B is 
substantially smaller than 1.0. For example, across all countries, 74 . 0
, , ≤
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T B B at  0 = θ . 
The 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T B B
, , -ratio is s-shaped in θ  , crossing the 1.0-threshold line for medium levels 
of  θ   (reaching  a  cross-country  peak  of  15 . 1 ≈   for  55 . 0 = θ in  Luxembourg),  and  then  again 
converging to  1
, , =
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T B B  for  0 . 1 → θ . This relationship is due to mutually enforcing 
and mitigating effects resulting from the patterns depicted in Figures 1-4. 
 
3.3.2 Gini index 
Analogously to the Theil-index ratios presented in Figure 5, Gini-index ratios are plotted in Figure 
6. The graph top left gives the Gini-index ratio, 
DEAHEI DOMHEI G G ; up right depicts the between-
subgroup ratio, 
DEAHEI G DOMHEI G B B
, , ; down left the within-subgroup ratio, 
DEAHEI G DOMHEI G W W
, , ; 
down  right  the  overlap-component  ratios, 
DEAHEI DOMHEI O O .  Several  parallelisms  to  the  results 
concerning  the  Theil  index  occur.  First,  with  the  only  exception  being  Poland, 
DEAHEI G ,  like 
DEAHEI T ,  signals  more  inequality  than  its  DOMHEI  analogue,  and  this  effect  intensifies  as  θ    
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decreases (see upper left graph of Figure 6). The ratios 
DEAHEI DOMHEI T T  and 
DEAHEI DOMHEI G G  are 
even similarly sized. Second, the within- and the between subgroup ratios of the Theil and the Gini 
index change in a likewise manner: the increase of the within-subgroup component ratio in θ  (see 
graph bottom left) as well as the s-shape of the between-subgroup-component ratio (see graph up 
right) is reconfirmed.  
The within- and the between-component ratios for the two indices, however, differ slightly. 
For  most  countries  and  values  of  θ , 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T DEAHEI G DOMHEI G W W W W
, , , , < and 
DEAHEI T DOMHEI T DEAHEI G DOMHEI G B B B B
, , , , < . This can be explained by the overlap-component ratio, 
DEAHEI DOMHEI O O , capturing some of the variation. Overlaps are sensitive to the transformation 
procedure  as  equivalent-income  distributions’  overlaps  of  any  two  subgroups  are  weighted 
differently, by 
DOMHEI
i p  vs. 
DEAHEI
i p .  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
 
3.4 Inequality parades 
Figure 7 illustrates the implications of size vs. needs weighting for cross-country comparisons of 
inequality. Two ‘inequality parades’ for each index are provided – one for the DOMHEI and one for 
the DEAHEI. Parades are obtained by sorting countries according to their index.
9 The country with 
equivalent incomes being most equally distributed is assigned a ‘1,’ the country with the most 
unequal distribution a ‘20.’ The upper two graphs give country rankings by the Theil index, the 
graphs below by the Gini index. As demonstrated in previous literature (cf. for example Coulter et 
al. (1992), Burkhauser et al. (1996), Aaberge and Melby (1998), Duclos and Makdissi (2005)), 
rankings are sensitive to the chosen index and equivalence-scale elasticity. In addition, it turns out 
that the conversion method itself has an impact on the inequality parade. 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
  Let the sequence of ranks reported be  , , ,
DOMHEI DEAHEI DOMHEI DEAHEI T T G G     . Then, taking 
Germany as an example, the numbers are [ ] 7,8,8,9  when  4 . 0 = θ , and [ ] 6,7,9,10  when  2 . 0 = θ ; 
[ ] 10,10,9,8  and [ ] 8,9,6,4  in case of Switzerland. Size- and needs-weighted rankings, by definition,   
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coincide for  0 . 1 = θ , Yet, in case of the Theil (Gini) index, rankings already become different for 
95 . 0 ≤ θ  ( 80 . 0 < θ ). This is illustrated by Table 3, where the frequency and size of country re-
rankings is summarized. Consider, for example the entry in column labeled ‘1’ (‘-2’) and row 
25 . 0 = θ  in case of the Theil index. Here we have a value of ‘4’ (‘2’). This entry means that four 
(two)  countries  ascend  (descend)  one  rank  (two  ranks)  in  the  parade  when  switching  from  a 
conversion by size to needs.
10 The last column of Table 3 (‘Sum’) gives the sum of the following 
product: number of ascends times frequency of occurrence. This is an aggregate measure of the 
rankings’ sensitivity. For example, consider the entry in row ‘ 0.20,G θ = .’ There we have the value 
12 1 2 2 5 = ⋅ + ⋅  as five countries ascend two and two one rank. In case of the Theil index (Gini 
index), parades become more sensitive when  θ  goes down as long as  25 . 0 ≥ θ  ( 15 . 0 ≥ θ ). A 
further lowering of θ  does not lead to a further increase of re-rankings. In sum, these results show 
that the conversion procedure has significant effects for cross-country inequality rankings for typical 
values of θ . 
 
4 Conclusion 
For 20 countries, we have presented inequality estimates for a size and a needs weighted quasi-
homogeneous equivalent-income distribution. The theoretical properties of both distributions have 
been explored in Ebert and Moyes (2003) and Shorrocks (2004). Our empirical examination reveals 
that country inequality rankings are conversion sensitive for equivalence scales implying reasonable 
within-household size economies. By means of a decomposition analysis, we have investigated the 
mechanisms and identified the key source that make needs and size weighted inequality estimates 
diverge. That inequality estimates are typically lower in the DOMHEI is driven by two effects: 
Higher weights of large household units in case of size weighting in combination with low income 
inequality among households with children.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                
9 Such a ranking ignores the possibility that average equivalent-income levels differ across countries. So, a country – 
such as the US – is at the bottom of the ranking although average equivalent income in the US is among the highest. 
10 Ascending (descending) means that the number assigned to a country in the ranking becomes smaller (bigger).   
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Table 1a. Sample description and coverage by subgroups 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note. Disposable household incomes per month (weighted), PPP adjusted in USD. Ns are non-weighted numbers of observations. 
Coverage gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is covered by the respective household type. A denotes adult; C 
denotes child. The adjacent figure gives the respective number of household members.   
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Table 1b. Sample description and coverage for whole sample 
Country 
Average 
income  N  Coverage 
Average 
 household size 
AT  2,386  1,959  89.67  2.11 
BE  2,386  1,886  94.2  2.11 
EE  693  4,943  89.38  2.16 
FI  2,002  9,410  95.19  2.01 
FR  2,257  9,338  91.87  2.21 
DE  1,118  10,037  94.19  1.91 
GR  1,619  3,081  81.38  2.39 
HU  733  1,643  84.29  2.21 
IE  2,256  1,851  83.03  2.37 
IT  2,082  6,334  82.8  2.32 
LU  3,578  2,174  90.33  2.23 
NO  2,635  11,279  94.43  1.99 
PL  838  23,728  78.15  2.51 
RU  379  2,465  79.99  2.28 
SI  1,244  2,566  75.02  2.46 
ES  2,057  3,760  78.93  2.37 
SE  1,937  13,450  95.95  1.89 
CH  3,113  3,358  93.25  2.14 
UK  2,575  23,209  92.03  2.16 
US  3,543  43,711  89.46  2.24 
Note. Average disposable household incomes per month (weighted) of the household types taken 
into account, PPP adjusted in USD. N is the non-weighted number of observations per country. 
Coverage gives the percentage of the total weighted population that is covered by the 9 household 
types.  
 
Table 2. Theil coefficients by subgroups 
Country   A1C0               A1C1               A1C2              A1C3              A2C0              A2C1              A2C2              A2C3              A3C0          
AT  11.77  5.52  8.30  2.21  13.37  9.36  9.26  11.03  8.46 
BE  16.82  8.15  9.82  2.03  81.51  14.50  11.15  9.17  12.32 
EE  23.88  19.06  12.03  13.41  25.75  23.59  19.03  20.15  17.95 
FI  14.38  7.25  4.19  4.38  15.22  9.03  8.74  14.49  8.26 
FR  17.35  11.93  9.91  10.10  14.18  10.17  10.70  11.10  11.35 
DE  17.66  8.77  14.71  2.70  13.89  10.32  13.37  8.84  9.90 
GR  28.80  22.11  21.28  0.00  21.87  15.66  15.81  12.96  14.20 
HU  22.84  17.15  3.82  7.36  16.11  20.02  13.11  14.67  8.14 
IE  41.41  6.91  6.35  4.95  21.28  19.88  9.57  19.55  12.31 
IT  22.99  12.20  14.68  15.78  23.78  15.31  16.07  35.64  18.06 
LU  14.63  7.07  11.31  2.22  12.22  8.59  10.54  9.43  8.72 
NO  14.33  11.82  5.79  2.68  17.36  7.44  12.82  26.18  11.60 
PL  14.35  16.99  12.13  12.73  13.50  16.04  16.46  16.38  14.22 
RU  41.17  45.63  35.57  0.00  52.46  51.95  31.95  60.62  24.87 
SI  14.32  10.66  13.76  ---  14.00  8.96  8.15  7.15  10.58 
ES  27.61  14.69  22.06  20.92  23.35  16.38  19.60  35.24  15.44 
SE  13.01  9.54  5.62  4.28  10.36  8.85  19.25  10.44  5.97 
CH  22.32  5.59  12.37  4.97  15.90  22.71  9.52  11.18  14.40 
UK  32.85  10.06  9.36  6.06  22.60  16.25  23.69  19.90  15.79 
US  29.67  24.41  29.68  23.75  23.94  23.05  21.04  22.10  17.49 
Note. A denotes adult; C denotes child. The adjacent figure gives the respective number of 
household members. 
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Table 3.  Re-rankings 
Frequencies of re-rankings of specific magnitude 
θ   Index 
5  4  3  2  1  -1  -2  -3  -4 
Sum 
        7  5  1      7 
0.00  T  
G         3  3  3  3      9 
        7  5  1      7 
0.05  T  
G     1    2  2  4  3      10 
        7  4    1    7 
0.1  T  
G   1      2  1  3  2  1    10 
      1  3  3  1      5 
0.15  T  
G       2  2  2  5  2  1    12 
      1  4  6        6 
0.2  T  
G         5  2  4  2    1  12 
    1    4  3  2      7 
0.25  T  
G         1  6  2  1    1  8 
    1    4  1  3      7 
0.3  T  
G         1  5  3      1  7 
        5  3  1      5 
0.35  T  
G         2  2  3    1    6 
        5  3  1      5 
0.4  T  
G       1  2  2  3  3      9 
        7  3  2      7 
0.45  T  
G       1  2  2  4  1  1    9 
      1  4  4  1      6 
0.5  T  
G       1  2  1  2  3      8 
      2  1  1  2      5 
0.55  T  
G       1    1  2  1      4 
      1  2    2      4 
0.6  T  
G         1  1  1  1      3 
      1  2    2      4 
0.65  T  
G         1  1  1  1      3 
        4    2      4 
0.7  T  
G           2  2        2 
        3  1  1      3 
0.75  T  
G           1  1        1 
        1  1        1 
0.8  T  
G                     0 
        1  1        1 
0.85  T  
G                     0 
        1  1        1 
0.9  T  
G                     0 
        1  1        1 
0.95  T  
G                     0 
Note. ‘Sum’ is a sum of five products. Each product is: magnitude of  
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Figure 3. Overall mean equivalent-income
ratio.
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Figure 4. Equivalent-income share ratios.
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Table A1. Data files 













a)  AT  at00h  13.7603  1  0.914 
Belgium
a)  BE  be00h  40.3399  1  0.921 
Estonia  EE  ee00h    1  7.045 
Finland
a)  FI  fi00h  5.94573  1  0.979 
France
a)  FR  fr00h  6.55957  1  0.915 
Germany
a)  DE  de00h  1.95583  1  0.981 
Greece
a)  GR  gr00h  339.170  1  0.684 
Hungary  HU  hu99h    1.053  107.337 
Ireland
a)  IE  ie00h  0.78756  1  0.953 
Italy
a)  IT  it00h  1936.33  1  0.808 
Luxembourg
a)  LU  lu00h  40.3399  1  0.988 
Norway  NO  no00h    1  9.010 
Poland  PL  pl99h    1.026  1.820 
Russia  RU  ru00h    1  7.351 
Slovenia  SI  si99h    1.017  141.385 
Spain
a)  ES  es00h  166.368  1  0.742 
Sweden  SE  se00h    1  9.190 
Switzerland  CH  ch00h    1  1.897 
United Kingdom  UK  uk99h    1.046  0.632 
United States  US  us00h    1  1.000 
Note. a) Countries where the PPP conversion factor is normalized with respect to the EUR. 
For all other countries, the PPP conversion factor refers to the country-specific currencies. 
 
Table A2. Gini coefficients by subgroups 
Country  A1C0  A1C1  A1C2  A1C3  A2C0  A2C1  A2C2  A1C3  A3C0 
AT  26.43  18.31  21.33  11.09  27.84  22.37  22.99  24.75  23.00 
BE  27.46  21.11  23.82  10.93  44.30  24.52  25.00  22.46  24.96 
EE  35.84  32.60  26.89  29.2  36.12  35.56  34.06  33.82  32.41 
FI  26.49  20.47  15.87  14.57  25.56  20.95  20.08  24.04  21.19 
FR  30.91  26.65  24.05  23.83  28.54  24.53  24.96  24.76  25.77 
DE  30.83  23.15  29.53  12.91  27.80  24.55  24.12  22.68  22.77 
GR  40.06  36.25  38.04  0.00  35.50  31.37  30.88  28.41  29.13 
HU  32.20  32.35  18.11  36.43  29.04  33.87  28.28  26.25  22.51 
IE  42.68  20.62  19.37  14.08  35.19  31.77  23.56  31.71  27.22 
IT  34.52  26.35  27.84  28.70  34.47  29.70  30.43  39.86  31.92 
LU  27.96  21.68  25.90  11.23  27.17  23.21  25.15  24.10  23.31 
NO  27.49  21.92  17.25  11.98  26.21  19.18  20.89  25.49  20.91 
PL  27.50  30.86  26.87  25.73  27.07  30.11  30.05  30.23  28.46 
RU  41.92  50.81  46.34  0.00  44.65  50.19  43.87  57.23  36.86 
SI  29.24  24.64  30.72  ---  28.43  23.29  21.35  21.56  25.20 
ES  38.75  30.42  38.88  34.39  35.67  30.56  34.14  44.00  30.31 
SE  26.63  21.00  16.87  14.08  24.00  20.71  22.80  21.25  18.60 
CH  31.66  18.74  26.74  18.04  28.77  26.44  22.25  25.63  29.00 
UK  36.96  23.73  22.22  17.96  34.99  30.37  32.73  32.20  29.32 
US  40.57  35.83  39.18  35.78  36.44  34.94  33.54  34.55  31.48 
Note. A denotes adult; C denotes child. The adjacent figure gives the respective number of 
household members. 
 